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THE CUTLER LECTURES 
Established at the College oj William and Mary 
in Virginia by 1ames Goold Cutler 
oj Rochester, N. Y. 
o 
The late James Goold Cutler, of Rochester, 
New York, in making his generous gift to the 
endowmen t of the Marshall-Wythe School of 
Government and Citizenship in the College of 
William and Mary provided, among other things, 
that one lecture should be given at the College 
in each calendar year by some person "who is an 
outstanding authority on the Constitution of 
the United States." Mr. Cutler wisely said that 
it appeared to him that the most useful contri-
bution he could make to promote the making of 
democracy safe for the world (to in vert Presi-
dent Wilson's aphorism) was to promote serious 
consideration by as ma'ny people as pqssible of 
certain points fundamental and therefore vital 
to the permanency of constitutional govern-
ment in the United States. Mr. Cutler de-
clared as a basic proposi tion that our political 
system breaks down, when and where it fails, 
because of the lack of sound education of the 
people for , whom and by whom it was intended 
to be carried on. 
Mr. Cutler was one of the few eminently suc-
cessful business men who took time from his 
busy life to study constitutional government. 
As a result of his study, he recognized with 
unusual clearness the magnitude of our debt to 
the makers, interpreters and defenders of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
He was deeply interested in the College of 
William and Mary because he was a student of 
history and knew what great contributions were 
made to the cause of constitutional government 
by men who taught and studied here- Wythe 
and Randolph, Jefferson and Marshall, Monroe 
and Tyler, and a host of others who made this 
coun try great. He, therefore, thought it pecu-
liarly fitting to endow a chair of government 
here a~d to provide for a popular "lecture each 
year by some outstanding authority on the 
Constitution of the United States." 
The second lecturer in the course was Honor-
able George W. Wickersham, former Attorney-
General of the United States, and now Chairman 
of the National Commission on Law Observ-
ance and Enforcement. 
J NO. GARLAND POLLARD, 
Dean oj the Marshall-Wythe School oj 
Government and Citizenship oj the 
College oj William and lVlary. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND PRO· 
HIBITION ENFORCEMENT* 
The Constitution of the United States is one 
of those extremely rare products of statesman-
ship, the excellence of which has not been im-
paired by the vicissi tudes of changing times, 
the cri ticism of scholars, or the resen tmen t of 
political factions. The idea that it was struck 
off at a heat by the momen tary inspiration of a 
man or a group of men, to which Mr. Gladstone, 
in an outburst of admiration, gave expression, 
has not stood the test of historical analysis. 
But the far-reaching wisdom of the framers has 
been emphasized by proof that the Constitution 
was a development of well known principles of 
English Government, modified and adapted to 
the requirements of the newly enfranchised 
American nation. The Constitutional Convention 
built a structure adapted to the needs of cen-
turies, upon the deep and sure foundations of 
those principles of English liberty which had 
been achiev~d in six hundred years of struggle. 
None of its provisions ran counter to the funda-
*An address delivered at the College of William and Mary under 
the auspices of the James Goold Cutler Foundation, on May 7, H129, 
by George W. Wickersham, former Attorney-General of the United 
States. 
mental political principles of any considerable 
number of the American people. It is true that "in 
order to form a more perfect union," the Federal 
Government was endowed with powers greater 
than some of the leading statesmen 'of the time 
thought wise or safe for the preservation of 
individual liberty. But the feebleness of the 
government of the Confederation had brought 
the country into such chaotic condition that 
the great majority of the people were quite 
ready to accept a central government strong 
enough to secure peace and justice at home 
and to command respect abroad. The fact is, 
that the Constitution was the product of the 
aristocracy of the American Democracy: not 
necessarily the aristocracy of birth or wealth, 
but the aristocracy of brains and character. It 
was framed by educated men, very largely 
lawyers, but all men who had studied deeply 
the history of governments in the past, and who 
were capable of deducing sound conclusions 
from the experience of other nations. The 
highest statesmanship consists in the ability to 
accurately read past history and apply its 
lessons to the advancement of the interests of 
one's own country, and in the avoidance of 
those mistakes which in the past have brought 
misfortune upon governments and the peoples 
dependen t upon them. 
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To make a strong government, and at the same 
time to preserve the liberty of the individual 
citizen, and not so greatly to restrict the sover-
eignty of the States as to destroy local self-gov-
ernment, was the essential problem before the 
Convention of 1787. How wisely and how suc-
cessfully they wrought, is demonstrated by the 
history of the one hundred and forty years suc-
ceeding the adoption of the Constitution. 
In the framing of the Constitution the position 
and powers of the Judiciary were recognized to 
be of paramount importance. Under the Con-
federation, there were no separate national 
courts. As a matter of fact, there was no nation. 
The absence of courts of the Confederation con-
stituted, perhaps, its greatest weakness. In the 
Constitution of 1787, framed in order to form a 
more perfect union and to establish justice, this 
deficiency in the existing government was neces-
sarily to .be dealt with, and by the Third Article, 
it was declared: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such in-
ferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish." 
The second section of the same Article spe-
cifically declared: 
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this Cons6-
[ 7 1 
tution,c' the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their authority;- to Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls;- to 
all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; 
to Controversies to which the United States 
shall be a Party;- to Controversies between two 
or more States;- between a State and Citizens of 
another State;- between citizens of different 
States;- between citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, 
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects ~ " 
Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, ob-
serves: 
"The propriety and fitness of these judicial 
powers seem to result, as a necessary conse-
quence, from the union of these states in one 
national government, and they may be con-
sidered as requisite to its existence. The judicial 
power in every government must be coextensive 
with the power of legislation ... Were there 
no power to interpret, pronounce, and execute 
the law, the govern men t would ei ther perish 
through its own imbecility, as was the case with 
the articles of confederation, or other powers 
must be assumed by the legislative body, to the 
destruction of liberty."C) 
The same section ~ of Article III provides that 
~n all cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
(1 ) 1 Kent, Lecture 14. (Ninth Ed. p. 322.) 
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min.isters and consuls and those in which a State 
shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction. In all other cases before 
mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appel-
late jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with 
such exceptions and under such regulations as 
the Congress shall make. Paragraph 3 then pro-
vides as follows: 
"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial 
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes 
shall have been committed; but when not com-
mitted within any State, the Trial . ,shall be at 
such Place or Places as the Congress,may by Law 
have directed." , 
Probably nothing in the whole debates over 
the Constitution, says Mr. Charles Warren in a 
recen t work (2) 
"is more astonishing than the slight discussion 
reported by Madison as given to the Judiciary 
Article of the report of the Committee of Detail 
of August 6th. It is probable, however, that 
Madison considerably condensed his notes on 
this point owing to the technicalities of the 
subject." 
While Madison has not reported very much 
discussion 'over this subject, yet in the debates 
over the ratification of the Constitution in the 
(2) "The Making of the Constitution." 
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conventions of the various States, a great deal 
was said concerning the necessity of establishing 
independent courts, as contrasted with the ex-
pediency of vesting the Federal judicial power 
in State tribunals, subject only to the right of 
review in the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Mr. Hamilton dealt with the subject at 
length in at least four numbers of The Federalist 
(Nos. 7S, 79, SO, Sl). It would be inappropriate 
and wholly unnecessary here to review the 
succinct and convincing arguments employed 
by Hamilton in those papers, in showing the 
necessity for the establishment of independent 
courts of justice for the interpretation of legis-
lative acts deriving their authority from, or 
purporting to infringe upon, powers conferred 
upon the Federal government or denied to the 
State governments by the Constitution. 
"The interpretation of the laws is the proper 
and peculiar province of the courts," he says. 
"A constitution is in fact and must be regarded 
by the judges as a fundamental law. It there-
fore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning 
as well as the meaning of any particular act 
proceeding from the legislative body. If there 
should happen to be an irreconciliable variance 
between the two, that which has the superior 
obligation and validity ought, of course, to be 
preferred; or in other words, the Constitution 
ought to be preferred to a statute, the intention 
r 10 1 
of the people to the in ten tion of their agen ts." 
(No. 78.) 
The argument in support of the exercise of 
the powers of the Federal judiciary to hold 
invalid an unconstitutional law has never been 
more succinctly, forcibly and satisfactorily put 
than in these words. 
The necessity for the establishment of one 
court of supreme and final jurisdiction in the 
determination of questions arising under the 
Constitution, was conceded by almost all con-
cerned in framing or discussing the Constitution, 
and scarcely ever has been disputed. Differences 
of opinion always have existed as to the pro-
visions vesting the judicial power of the United 
States "in such inferior courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish." 
Hamilton said this power 
"is evidently calculated to obviate the necessity 
of having recourse to the Supreme Court in 
every case of Federal cognizance. It is intended 
to enable the national government to institute 
or authorize in each State or district of the 
United States a tribunal competent to the deter-
mination of matters of national jurisdiction 
within its terms." (Federalist, No. 81.) 
He even thought there were substantial 
reasons against conferring Federal power upon 
the existing courts of the several States, for, he 
said: 
[ IT ] 
"The most discerning can foresee how far the 
prevalence of a local spirit may be found to dis-
qualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction 
of national causes; while every man may dis-
cover that courts constituted like those of some 
of the States would be improper channels of 
the judicial authority of the Union." 
The inevitable diversity of opinion in the 
different States would require an unrestrained 
course of appeals to the Supreme Court, which, 
even in 1787, Mr. Hamilton saw would be a 
source of public and ' private inconvenience, and 
which, in 19~9, would be a sheer impossibility, 
for it would break down any single court with 
the sheer weight of business. Moreover, the 
character of the Federal judicial power, com-
prehending, as it does under the Constitution, 
can troversies between ci tizens of differen t S ta tes 
and between citizens of a State and foreign 
citizens or subj~cts, peculiarly requires exercise 
by a tribunal independent of local influences. 
The First Congress under the Constitution 
assembled at Philadelphia on March 4, 1789, 
although a quorum of both Houses was not 
present until April 6th. President Washington 
was sworn in to office on April 30th, and there-
upon the new government proceeded to func-
tion. (3) 
(3) Story on Const., Sec. 278. 
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One of the first duties to which the Congress 
addressed itself was the preparation of a J u-
diciary Act. Mr. Charles Warren, the historian 
of the Supreme Court, a few years ago pub-
lished an interesting article in the Harvard Law 
Review, entitled "New Light on the History of 
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789" (4) . No ade-
quate account of this famous legislation, Mr. 
Warren says, had ever been written, and Ells-
worth's latest able and careful biographer said 
in 1905 that "no complete history of the bill 
can now be written." Mr. Warren, however, 
found among the archives of the United States 
not only the original draft of the Judiciary Act 
as it was introduced into the Senate, but also 
the original amendments to the draft bills sub-
mitted during the Committee and Senate de-
bates, and a copy of the bill as it passed the 
Senate ann went to the House. Those docu-
ments throw a new and constructive light upon 
the history of the measure, which dispels, 
among other things, the tradition that the bill 
was drafted by Oliver Ellsworth and not ma-
terially changed during its passage into law. 
Mr. Warren says it is clear now that very im-
portant, and, in some instances, vital changes 
were made in the bill before it became law. He 
states the fact to be that the final , form of the 
(4 ) 37 Harv. Law Rev., p. 49. 
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Act and its subsequent history cannot be prop-
erly understood unless it is realized that it was 
a compromise measure, so framed as to secure 
the votes of those who, while willing to see the 
experimen t of the Federal Cons ti tu tion tried, 
were insistent that the Federal courts should be 
given the minimum powers and jurisdiction. 
"Its provisions completely satisfied no one, 
although they pleased the anti-Federalists more 
than the Federalists." 
Compromise as it was, it remained almost 
unchanged for nearly a century. But M r. 
Warren points out that the Judiciary Act was 
not only a compromise, but . its final form was 
closely tied up with, and largely depended upon, 
the fate of the various amendmen ts to the J u-
diciary Article of the Constitution, which were 
being debated in Congress during the discussion 
over the Judiciary Act. It is a matter of fam-
iliar knowledge that objection was made in 
many of the States to the absence from the new 
Constitution of a Bill of Rights, and that rati-
fication of the Constitution was only secured by 
the promise of its friends to lend their influence 
and their best efforts to the immediate adoption 
of amendments to the Constitution which would 
supply this defect. It was particularly objected 
that the judicial power was not subject to reason-
able restraint; that trial by jury in criminal 
[ qj 
cases was not adequately secured, and was not 
at all required in civil cases. 
Consideration of these proposed amendmen ts 
proceeded in the First Congress at the same time 
that the Committee was drafting ' the Judiciary 
Act. After a long debate, the Senate voted to 
establish Federal District Courts, and after a 
struggle over the jurisdiction with which they 
were to be invested, the jurisdiction as specified 
in the bill was agreed to. The bill was laid aside 
in the House of Representatives, pending the 
discussion over the proposed amendments to 
the Constitution. There had been serious appre-
hension among many of the delegates to the 
various State Conventions lest the new Federal 
government should not only invade the juris-
diction of States, but that unless restrained by 
positive provisions in the fundamental law, it 
would encroach upon the very rights of the 
citizen to secure which the War of Independence 
had been successfully waged. Patrick Henry, in 
Virginia, Mr. Holmes, in Massachusetts, and 
many other delegates in those and other States 
complained of the inadequacy of the Third 
Article of the Constitution to fully ensure all 
the privileges of the citizen guaranteed by the 
great charters of English liberty- Magna Charta, 
the Bill of Rights and the Habeas Corpus Act. 
Mr. Henry delcared: 
[ I5 1 
"My mind will not be quieted till I see some-
thing substantial come forth in the shape of a 
bill of rights." (3 Eliot's Debates, 46~.) 
His apprehensions were shared by many 
others. These objections did not prevent the 
adoption of the Constitution, but, as Judge 
Story says: 
"They produced such a strong effect upon the 
public mind, that Congress, immediately after 
their first meeting, proposed certain amend-
'ments, embracing all the suggestions which 
appeared of most force; and these amendments 
were ratified by the several States, and are now 
become a part of the Constitution."(5) 
Not until those amendments were passed by 
the House, was the consideration of the Judiciary 
Bill again taken up. As a result of the dis-
cussions in both Houses, the Judiciary Bill in 
its final form was signed by the President on 
September ~4, 1789, and on the same day, the 
Senate and the House finally agreed on the form 
of twelve Amendments to the Constitution to 
be submitted to the States. Those amendments, 
of which ten subsequently were agreed to by 
the requisite number of States, included two of 
importance in their bearing upon the question 
here under discussion. The Fifth Amendmen t 
reads as follows: 
(5 ) 1 Story on Const., 5th Ed., Sec. 1782. 
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"Article V. No person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of 
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law, nor shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation." 
The Sixth Article is as follows: 
"Article VI. In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining Wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have ,the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence." 
The Judiciary Act provided for a Supreme 
Court composed of a Chief Justice and five 
Associate Justices. It divided the United States 
in to thirteen districts, l~nq. 'i pr,o;vided for the 
establishment in each of1those districts of a 
District Court, consisting -.of :one Judge, to 
[ 17 1 
reside in the District for which he is appointed, 
and the allocation of those districts among three 
Circuits, in each of which was established a 
Circuit Court, to be holden by two Justices of 
the Supreme Court and the District Judge of 
such District, two of whom should constitute a 
quorum. The jurisdiction of the District Courts 
was prescribed in the nin th section as follows: 
"That the District Courts shall have, ex-
clusively of the courts of the several States, 
cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall 
be cognizable under the authority of the United 
States, committed within their respective dis-
tricts, or upon the high seas; where no other 
punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty 
stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, 
or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six 
months, is to be inflicted; and shall also have 
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including 
all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or 
trade of the United States, where the seizures 
are made, on waters which are navigable from 
the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, 
within their respective districts as well as upon 
the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the 
right of a common law remedy, where the com-
mon law is competent to give it; and shall also 
have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures 
on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made, 
and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures 
incurred, under the laws of the United States. 
[ 18 1 
And shall also have cognizance, concurrent with 
the courts of the several States, or the circuit 
courts, as the case may be, of all causes where 
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 
And shall also have cognizance, concurrent as 
last mentioned, of all suits at common law where 
the United States sue, and the matter in dispute 
amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value 
of one hundred d.ollars. And shall also have 
jurisdiction exclusively of the courts of the 
several States, of all suits against consuls or 
vice-consuls, except for offenses above the 
description aforesaid. And the trial of issues in 
fact, in the district courts, in all causes except 
civil causes of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction, shall be by jury." (6) 
Section 11 defined the jurisdiction of the 
Circuit Courts. They were given original cog-
nizance, concurrent with the courts of the 
several States, 
"of all suits of a civil nature at common law or 
in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, 
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five 
hundred dollars, and the United States are 
plain tiffs, or peti tioners; or an alien is a party, 
or the suit is between a citizen of the State 
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another 
State. And shall have exclusive cognizance of 
all crimes ' and offences cognizable under the 
authority of the United States, except where 
(6) 1 Stats. at L. 77. 
[ 19 I 
this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the 
United States shall otherwise direct, and con-
current jurisdiction with the district courts of 
the crimes and offences cognizable therein ... " 
The Circuit Courts were also given appellate 
jurisdiction from the District Courts, under 
regulations and restrictions in the Act provided. 
The unlimited power vested in Congress by 
Section 1 of Article III, to establish inferior 
courts, has been exercised only to a limited 
.degree. The Judiciary Act of 1789, as we have 
seen, established District and Circuit Courts. 
The Circuit Courts established by the Act of 
February 13, 1801, followed by the appointment 
of the so-called "midnight Judges" by President 
John Adams, were promptly legislated out of 
existence when the Jeffersonian Administration 
'came into power, on March 8, 180~. Although 
there was some modification in the Circuit 
Courts as established by the Judiciary Act of 
1789, no radical change was made in the system 
of Federal Courts created by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, until the establishment of the 
Circuit Courts of Appeal by the Act of March 3, 
189l. 
The COt;lrt of Cla:ims, created by the Act of 
February ~4, 1855 (10 Stat. 61~), in the true 
sense of the term, is not a court. It passes upon 
claims against the governmen t, bu tits judgmen ts 
r 20 1 
are only advisory, and rest for their execution 
upon the will of Congress in its appropriation 
acts. But, as Chief Justice Taney said, in the 
opinion he prepared for the case of Gordon v. 
United States (117 U . S. 697, 702) : 
"The award of execution is a part, and an 
essen tial part of every judgmen t passed by a 
court exercising judicial power. It is no judg-
ment, in the legal sense of the term, without it." 
The Court of Private Land Claims, estab-
lished by the Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 854) 
falls within the same category. Neither of them 
can properly be called "inferior courts of t he 
United States" within the meaning of Article 
III of the Constitution. 
The Court of Customs Appeals, created by 
the Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, has also been 
heJd to be merely a legislative court (Ex Parte 
Bakelite Corporation, U. S. Supreme Court, 
May 20, ] 929), though its status has again been 
thrown into doubt by the recent enactment of 
Congress (March 2, 1929, No. 914) giving it 
jurisdiction in patent cases. 
The Commerce Court, established by the Act 
of June 18, 1910, was aboJished by the Act of 
October 22, 1913 (38 Stat. 219). The Board of 
General Appraisers, under the Tariff Acts, has 
in recent times been called a court, and now is 
[ '2 I 1 
designated by legislation the Customs Court,C) 
but the decision in the Bakelite case treats it 
as another legislative court. 
The District Courts of the United States re-
main the only courts of first instance in criminal 
matters. From an early day it has been settled 
that the only crimes of which the Federal courts 
have jurisdiction are those created by Acts of 
Congress, and consequently the only acts which 
Congress may make punishable as crimes, are 
those within the legislative powers conferred 
upon Congress by the Constitution. With the 
adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, on 
J anuary ~9, 1919, followed by the enactment of 
the Prohibition Enforcement Law, October ~8, 
1919, a totally new volume of criminal juris-
diction has developed upon these Courts. The 
Amendment, in succinct but comprehensive 
terms, prohibited, after one year from the 
ratification of the Article, 
"the manufacture, sale, or transportation of 
intoxicating liquors within, the importation 
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from 
the United States and all territory subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage pur-
poses." 
The Prohibition Enforcement Law put in 
legislative form meticulous prohibitions against 
(1) Frankfurter and Landis, "The Business of the Supreme Court." 
[ 22 1 
manifold acts which might come within the 
intent, if not the express language of the Amend-
ment, and created a wide range of offenses, many 
of which are of a character that in almost all 
of the States, would be dealt with in courts of 
limited and inferior jurisdiction, but which, 
under the Federal system, have served to clog 
the dockets of the district courts, and cause 
. infinite delay in the enforcement of civil reme-
dies in those tribunals. 
Prior to the enactment of the so-called Jones 
Law, on March 2, 1929, many of the pro-
hibited acts were declared to be misdemeanors 
and punishable with fines of from $500.00 to 
$1,000.00 and by imprisonment for from thirty 
days to twelve mon ths . 
The Fifth Amendment declares that no person 
shall be held to answer for an infamous crime 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury. In a general way, any act punish-
able by law as being forbidden by statute, or 
injurious to public welfare, is denominated a 
crime, but commonly the word is used only with 
respect to grave offenses. Blackstone says:(8) 
"A crime or misdemeanor is an act committed 
or omitted, in violation of a public law either 
forbidding or commanding it. This general 
definition comprehends both crimes and mis-
(8) IV Commentaries. Ch. 1, p. 5. 
[ 23 1 
demeanors, which, properly speaking, are mere 
synonymous terms; though, in commo.n usage, 
the word 'crimes' is made to denote such offenses 
as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while 
smaller faults, and omissions of ress conse-
quence, are comprised under the geri. tler names 
of 'misdemeanors' only." 
By the United States Code (Crimil1;:ti Code 
and Criminal Procedure), Title 18, Part ~, 
Section 541, all offenses which may be punished 
by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year, shall be deemed felonies. All other 
offenses shall be deemed misdemeanors. I t is 
well settled that all felonies, as thus defined, 
are infamous crimes, for which no person shall 
be held to answer unless on a presen tmen t or 
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases 
,arising in the land or naval forces or in the 
militia when in actual service in time of war or 
public danger. It is said to be equally well 
settled that misdemeanors punishable by fine 
or by terms of imprisonment not exceeding one 
year, unless there should be coupled with the 
pllnishment or imprisonment some specific pro-
vision making the particular misdemeanor in-
famous, are not infamous crimes within the 
purview of the Fifth Amendment, ~nd may be 
prosecu ted by information. (9) So it has been 
(9) Falconi v. United States, 280 Fed. 766. 
[ 24 1 
held that prosecution for the first offense of 
selling liquor, which by Section ~9 of the 
National Prohibition Act is punishable by im-
prisonment not exceeding six months, without 
provision for sentence at hard labor, and which, 
therefore, is a statutory misdemeanor, under 
the Criminal Code, may be by information, and 
need not be by indictment.eO) 
The Court in the last cited case appears to 
make the test that if the offense is not a felony 
by the statute and can be punished only by 
imprisonment for twe(ve months or less, without 
hard labor, it is a misdemeanor and not an in-
famous crime, and may be prosecuted by in-
formation without indictment. 
The convenience of prosecution by informa-
tion is especially obvious in those communities 
where the Grand Jury meets at rare intervals, 
say quarterly or even semi-annually. As a 
commentator on the recent legislation says: 
"The only way by which the court calendars 
have been kept reasonably clear of trials for 
liquor law violations has been by avoiding jury 
trial, as a result of defendants pleading guilty." 
Rarely, says the writer, does an accused 
person plead guilty unless he has something to 
gain by the plea. The accused violator of the 
( 10) Cleueland v. Mattingly (Court of Appeals, D. C.), 287 Fed. 948; 
certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 744. 
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National Prohibition Act has something to 
gain. He dickers and fences with the prosecuting 
attorney. He will plead guilty provided the 
punishment is only a fine of such and such 
an amount. The attorney agrees.(II) 
By the Act of March 2, 1929, known as the 
Jones Act, supplementing the National Pro-
hi bi tion Act, it is provided: 
"Sec. 1. That wherever a penalty or penal-
ties are prescribed in a criminal prosecution by 
the National Prohibition Act, as amended and 
supplemented, for the illegal manufacture, sale, 
transportation, importation, or exportation of 
intoxicating liquor, as defined by section 1, 
Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, the 
penalty imposed for each such offense shall be a 
fine of not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not 
to exceed five years, or both: ... " 
"Sec. 2. This Act shall not repeal nor elimi-
nate any minimum penalty for the first or any 
subsequent offense now provided by the said 
National Prohibition Act." 
Section 29 of the National Prohibition Act 
provides: 
"Any person who manufactures or sells liquor 
in violation of this Chapter, shall for the first 
offense be fined not more than $1,000, or im-
prisoned not exceeding six months." 
(11) The Jones-Stalker Law, by Goodwin Cooke, American Bar 
Association Journal, ~ay, 1929, page 276. 
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This establishes a maxtmum, but not a 
minimum penalty for a first offense and there-
fore is not saved by Section ~9 of the Prohi-
bition Act. 
There are a number of offenses specified in the 
Prohibition Law which are denominated mis-
demeanors and punishable by a fine of not 
more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not 
more than one year, or both.(2) Whether or 
not misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment 
for twelve months and by a fine of $1,000 as 
a minimum, would be considered misdemean,9rs, 
which may be prosecuted by information only, 
is perhaps doubtful. The decisions upholding 
prosecution by information uniformly deal with 
« 'd " " IT" pet t y mls emeanors, pet t y orrenses ; 
"smaller faults or omissions of less consequence." 
A more serious question arises with respect 
to the right of trial by jury, secured by Article 
III, Section ~, Clause 3, of the Constitution, 
in the prosecution of all crimes, except in case 
of impeachment, supplemented by the provisions 
of the Sixth Amendment that in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed. That the framers 
(12) See Supplemental Act, November 23, 1921, Sec. 6; National 
Prohibiton Act, Sec. 24; Same, Title 3, Sec. 15, Sec. 20. 
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of the Constitution meant to limit the right of 
trial by jury in the Sixth Amendment to those 
persons who are subject to indictment or pre-
sentment in the Fifth, was declared by the 
Supreme Court in the case of Ex parte Milligan, 
4 'Vall. ~, 1~3. On the other hand, as had been 
pointed out by the Supreme Court in another 
case:(13) 
"According to many adjudged cases, arising 
un<;ler constitutions which declare, generally, 
that the right of trial by jury shall remain in-
violate, there are certain minor or petty offenses 
that may be proceeded against summarily, and 
without ajury; and, in respect to other offenses, 
the constitutional requirement is satisfied if the 
right to a trial by jury in an appellate court is 
accorded to the accused." 
There seems to be an abundance of authority 
on the point that in England, it has been the 
constant course of legislation for cen turies past, 
to confer summary jurisdiction upon justices of 
the peace for the trial and conviction of minor 
statutory offenses, and the same has been the 
practice in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Vermont, 
Georgia and other States. (13a) 
The same principle was asserted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
of Schick v. United States,(14) in sustaining a 
(13 ) Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S., 540, 552. (14 ) 195 U. 5.65. 
(13a) Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 552, 553. 
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conviction for the violation of the provisions of 
the Oleomargarine Law, punishable by a pen-
alty of $50 fine, for each offense, which was 
tried on information and by a court, upon waiver 
of a jury trial by the parties. The Court held 
that so simple a penalty for violating a revenue 
statute, indicated only a petty offense, and not 
one necessarily involving any moral delinquency. 
Mr. Justice Brewer, writing the opinion of the 
Court, said: 
"The tru th is, the nature of the offense and 
the amount of punishment prescribed rather 
than its place in the statutes determine whether 
it is to be classed among serious or petty offenses, 
whether among crimes or misdemeanors. . . . 
In such a case there is no constitutional require-
ment of a jury." 
The Court held that the body of the Consti-
tution does not include a petty offense of the 
character described. It must be read in the light 
of the common law. The Convention, in framing 
Article III of the Constitution, employed the 
language, "the trial of all crimes," instead of, as 
originally drafted, "the trial of all criminal 
offenses," shall be by jury. There is no public 
policy which forbids the waiver of a jury in 
the trial of petty offenses, because there was no 
constitutional or statutory provision or public 
policy which required a jury in the trial of 
petty offenses. Here the penalty was very 
light. All of the Court but Harlan, J., agreed to 
the judgment. 
In the case of the United States v. Praeger,(1S) 
District Judge-Maxey, in Texas, held that where 
the punishment provided by Congress for the 
act under consideration was a fine of not more 
than $500 or imprisonment not to exceed six 
mon ths, or both, at the discretion of the Court, 
the parties had the right, under the authority of 
Schick v. United States,(16) by written stipu-
lation, to waive a jury. 
In Frank v. United States,(17) a violation of a 
section of the Food and Drug Act, which pro-
vided for no imprisonment, but merely a fine 
not exceeding $~OO, was held to be a petty 
offense, which did not require trial by jury. 
In Coates v. United States,(1S) defendant was 
indicted for a violation of the National Pro-
hibition Act on five counts: (1) for the unlawful 
possession of intoxicating liquors; (~) the un-
lawful possession of property designated for the 
manufacture of such liquor; (3) the actual 
manufacture; (4) the sale; (5) the maintenance 
of a nuisance where intoxicating liquor was 
being manufactured, kept, bottled and sold. 
He was convicted on the first, second, third and 
(15) 149 Fed. 474. 
(16) 195 u. S. 65. 
(17) 192 Fed. 864 (C. c. A. 6th Circ.) 
(18) 290 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th Circ.) 
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fifth coun ts. It was held by the Circui t Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that these 
offenses were crimes which could only be tried 
by a jury, and that the defendants could not 
waive a jury. Citing Thompson v. Utah, 170 
U. S. 343. 
In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, the Court 
said that there are offenses which are not crimes, 
and in them a jury may be dispensed with by 
consen t. They are of the kind which the common 
law classes as petty, as well from th"e prevailing 
consequences which conviction of them would 
entail upon the one committing them, as from 
the lack of any substantial moral blame-
worthiness necessarily implied in their com-
mISSIon. 
The question then becomes one of relativity, 
depending upon the seriousness of the charge. A 
prosecution for a first offense under Section 29 
of the National Prohibition Act could probably 
be initiated by information, and tried without a 
jury. Certainly a jury might be waived in such a 
case. But for any other offense under the Act, 
including second offenses under Section 29, it 
is quite clear that the prosecution must be by 
indictment, and trial must be by a jury. 
Trial by jury, the Supreme Court has held, is 
not simply trial by a jury of twelve men before 
an officer vested with authority to cause them 
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to be summoned and impanelled, to administer 
oaths to them and to the officer in charge, and 
to en ter judgment and issue execu tion on their 
verdict, 
"but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the 
presence and under the superintendence of a 
judge empowered to instruct them on the law 
and to advise them on the facts, and (except on 
acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their 
verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or 
the evidence." (19) 
Mr. Justice Gray, in writing the opinion 
in this case, cited an earlier decision where 
the Court said: 
"Trial by jury in the courts of the United 
States is a trial presided over by a judge, with 
authority, not only to rule upon objections to 
evidence, and to instruct the jury upon the law, 
but also, when in his judgment the due adminis-
tration of justice requires it, to aid the jury by 
explaining and commenting upon the testimony, 
and even giving them his opinion on questions 
of fact, provided only he submits those ques-
tions to their determination." (U. S. v. Phil-
adelphia & Reading R. Co., 123 U. S., 113, 114.) 
The fact that the guaran tee of trial by jury 
secured by the Constitution of the United States 
necessarily implies, not only that the facts shall 
be determined by a jury of twelve men, but that 
(19 ) Capitol Traction Co. v. Hoj, 174 U. s. 1, 13. 
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the trial must. be conducted by a judge, with 
authority, in his discretion, whenever he thinks 
it necessary to assist the jury in arriving at a 
just conclusion, to comment upon the evidence, 
call their attention to parts of it which he thinks 
important, and express his opinion upon the 
facts, is not always realized in discussions about 
trial by jury. It is a part of the guaranty of 
justice to the citizen, but it is also an obstacle 
in the way of establishing an inferior Federal 
Court of Criminal Justice, such as exists in 
many States, for the trial of even serious mis-
demeanors by the Court without a jury. 
Moreover, the judicial power of the United 
States can be exercised only by the Supreme 
Court, or an inferior court established under 
the terms of the Constitution, and this implies 
that the Court must be presided over by a judge 
appointed in conformity with that instrument. 
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution 
provides: 
"The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive 
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall 
not be diminished during their Continuance in 
Office." 
In view of these provisions, the Supreme Court 
has held that justices of the peace in the Dis-
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trict of Columbia are not judges of inferior 
courts of the United States, as they are not 
appointed to that office during good behavior; 
and that trial by a jury before a justice of the 
peace, having been unknown in England or 
America before the Declaration of Independence, 
was not within the contemplation of Congress 
in proposing, or the people in ratifying, the 
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. There-
fore, it may be taken as settled that no prose-
cution of any violation of an act of Congress, 
including the National Prohibition Act, for any 
offense more serious than a minor misdemeanor, 
could be tried without a jury, or could be tried 
in any tribunal' which cannot be characterized 
as an inferior court of the United States, within 
the meaning of the Constitution construed as 
above men tioned. 
These limitations constitute serious obstacles 
to the establishment of a Federal court of in-
ferior criminal jurisdiction for the disposition 
of violations of the National Prohibition Act. 
Not only do the .restrictions as to trial by jury 
and as to indictment interfere, but the provision 
requiring trials to be held in the State where 
the crime shall have been committed, probably 
would make necessary such an extensive multi-
plication of courts as to amount to a practical 
embargo upon dealing with minor' offenses 
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under the existing Prohibition Laws many 
other way than through the existing District 
Courts. 
The policy of the Jones Act, which seeks to 
compel observance of the Prohibition Law by 
extremely rigorous penalties, probably will de-
feat itself through the consequences which it 
entails in requiring prosecution by indictment, 
and not by information, and trial by jury for 
almost all violations. This will mean one of two 
things: either a very large increase in the num-
ber of Federal Judges, or the continued em-
barrassment of civil litigants in the delays 
caused by the swelling tide of criminal indict-
ments and trials under the Prohibition Act. 
In the Jones Act itself there was interjected a 
proviso which can be effective only as friendly 
counsel to the judiciary. I t reads as follows: 
"That it is the intent of Congress that the 
court, in imposing sentence hereunder, should 
discriminate between casual or slight violations 
and habitual sales of intoxicating liquor, or 
attempts to commercialize violations of the law." 
Far more effective than such a counsel of 
perfection to the judiciary would it be, if Con-
gress should discriminate in its legislation by 
providing specifically for the punishment of 
"casual or slight violations" of the law, by 
denominating them as misdemeanors or petty 
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offenses, and affixing to such offenses penal ties 
which would not raise them above the grade of 
petty misdemeanors which may be prosecuted 
by information, and tried by a court without a 
jury. This would result in a more speedy and 
effective enforcement of the law upon all except 
those engaged in "habitual sales of intoxicating 
liquor or attempts to commercialize violations 
of the law." The latter being serious offenses 
against the social body, in violation of the Con-
stitution and statute law, may be dealt with 
as other serious offenses are, by indictment and 
trial by jury. . 
Such a policy as that recommended was ac-
tually adopted by Congress in the District of Co-
lumbia Prohibition Law of March 3, 1917, which 
prohibited any person from directly or indirectly, 
in the District of Columbia, manufacturing or 
importing for sale or gift, selling, offering for 
sale, keeping for sale, trafficking in, etc., etc., 
any alcoholic or other prohibited liquors, for 
beverage purposes, and made any persons who 
should violate the provisions of the Act guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, 
subject to be fined not less than $300 nor more 
than $1,000 and to be imprisoned in the District 
jailor work-house for a period of not less than 
thirty days or more than one year, for each 
offense. Other offenses against different pro-
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VISIons of the Act were denominated misde-
meanors and made punishable by fines of not 
less than $50 nor more than $300, or imprison-
ment in the jailor workhouse of the District 
for not more than six months (Sec. 3); and in 
various sections, offenses against provisions in 
the Act are declared to be misdemeanors punish-
able by fines ,in amounts of $50, $100, $300 and 
$500, as the case might be, and imprisonment in 
the District j ail or workhouse for terms, in no 
instance exceeding twelve months, and in many 
instances being limited to from thirty days to 
six months. The Act was obviously drawn with 
a view to providing for its enforcement through 
punish men t before a local magistrate by small 
-fines or limited terms of imprisonment in the 
District jailor workhouse. 
The theory of the later legislation developed 
through the opposition to the enforcement of . 
the law which has been encountered since its 
enactment, has been to increase penalties until 
they have reached almost the same importance 
as those attributed to the most infamous crimes. 
It is yet to be demonstrated that respect for 
this law or for law in general shall be achieved 
by such policy. 
Lord Bryce, in the American Commonwealth, 
says: 
"The American Constitution is no exception 
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to the rule that everything which has power to 
win the obedience and respect of men must 
have its roots deep in the past, and that the 
more slowly every institution has grown so 
much the more enduring is it likely to prove." (20) 
The results of efforts to compel observance 
of particular laws by the imposition of extreme 
penalties, generally have proved unsatisfactory 
and it would seem probable that with respect to 
a law concerning which there is as much differ-
ence of opinion as the Prohibition Law, the 
existing legislative policy probably will not 
realize the objects of its enactment. A legislative 
scheme of small penalties, easily enforced, which 
would not leave it merely to the discretion of a 
judge in imposing sentence to discriminate be-
tween casual or slight violations and habitual 
sales of liquor, and attempts to commercialize 
violations of the law, while at the same time 
empowering him to impose penalties of an ex-
tremely rigorous character for the more serious 
category of offenses, would be far more effective 
in bringing about general observance of the pro-
hibitory provisions. The history of the law is 
replete with failure to compel respect and com-
pliance by excessive penalties. Not the possi-
bility of severe punishment, but swift and sure 
penalty for violation compels obedience to law. 
(2') I Am. Com. p. 29. 
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